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REMEDIES
By RALPH F. SIMPSON*
I.

No-FAULT INSURANCE

The Georgia legislature produced the long awaited "no fault" insurance
law to be known as the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act.'
The Act requires insurance coverage as a condition precedent to the operation of a motor vehicle which is required to be registered in the state of
Georgia.2 Upon implementation and regulation this may well be one of the
more important benefits of the statute. Now Georgians will be assured of
colliding with persons with insurance coverage providing for compensation
up to the "aggregate minimum limit of $5,000" per insured person for
economic loss, i.e., medical expenses, loss of earnings of income, funeral
services and expenses incurred in obtaining services from others which the
injured person may have performed for the benefit of "his or her household."
The survivability of this coverage or action is limited to the spouse or
dependent children of a deceased insured person.' Payment of the benefits
may, however, be made to the person having legal custody of the dependent child or children.'
Payments of benefits are to be made monthly as the loss accrues. In the
event the insurer fails to pay the benefits, the insured may sue to recover
same along with a "penalty exceeding" 25% of the amount due and reasonable attorneys' fees. The burden is placed upon the insurer to show that
the failure or refusal to pay was in good faith in order to avoid payment of
the penalty and attorneys' fees. 5 It will be most interesting to observe the
court's application of this portion of the Act and compare such applications to the decisions construing Ga. Code Ann. §50-1206 (Rev. 1974).
Hopefully, this new statute will mean what it says.
These benefits payable under the Act are not reduced by the payment
of other benefits such as workmen's compensation, hospitalization benefits
or uninsured motorists coverage benefits.' However, if a person is entitled
to economic loss benefits under the Act, he is precluded from recovering
same in an action for damages against a tort feasor.7 Unless the injury
sustained is a serious injury as defined therein, an insured is exempt for
payment of damages for non-economic loss.8
* Member of Reinhardt, Whitley and Sims, P.C., Tifton, Georgia. Emory University (B.A.,
1966); Mercer University (J.D., 1969). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3401b (Supp. 1974).
2. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3412 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §56-9915.2 (Supp. 1974).
3. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3403b(4) (Supp. 1974).
4. Id.
5. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3406b (Supp. 1974).
6. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3409b (Supp. 1974).
7. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3410b (Supp. 1974).
8. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3402b(j) (Supp. 1974).
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Persons occupying a motor vehicle knowing the same to b.e stolen, owning a vehicle not insured under the Act, and operating a motorcycle or
bicycle are not entitled to benefits thereunder.' Why these persons are not
included is not known, but hopefully it is not the same public policy which
places them all in this category. The Act applies to accidents and injuries
occuring after March 1, 1975.' 0
II.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Two cases during the survey period illustrate the confusion of the law
with respect to Georgia Code Ann. §56-1206 (Rev. 1971)" dealing with
penalties for bad faith of insurance companies in not paying a claim upon
demand. In the first, Key Life Insurance Co. of South Carolina v.
Mitchell,2 the jury's verdict awarding the penalty and attorneys' fees was
allowed to stand.
The other, Interstate Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Brown,'3 is
particularly interesting because of the dissenting opinion of Judge Evans
cataloging all the instances and situations in which penalties or attorneys'
fees under Ga. Code Ann. §56-1206 (Rev. 1971) may not be awarded.
There, the majority, after stating "[tihe evidence supports the verdict
and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a judgment n. o. v. or its motion for a new trial on this ground,"" directed that
attorneys' fees awarded by the jury be written off, stating:
The court erred in authorizing the jury to award attorney fees for bad
faith refusal to pay. The evidence was circumstantial and did not demand
9. GA. CODE ANN. §56-3408b (Supp. 1974).
10. Ga. Laws, 1974, p. 113 at 124.
11. GA. CODE ANN. §56-1206 (Rev. 1971) provides:
In the event of a loss which is covered by a policy of insurance and the refusal of
the insurer to pay the same within 60 days after a damand has been made by the
holder of the policy and a finding has been made that such refusal was in bad faith,
the insurer shall be liable to pay such holder, in addition to the loss, not more than
25 per cent. of the liability of the insurer for the loss and all reasonable attorney's
fees for the prosecution of the case against the insurer. The amount of such reasonable attorney's fees shall be determined by the trial jury and shall be included in
any judgment which is rendered in such action: Provided, however, such attorney's
fees shall be fixed on the basis of competent expert evidence as to the reasonable
value of such services, based on the time spent and legal and factual issues involved, in accordance with prevailing fees in the locality where such suit is pending:
Provided, further, that the trial court shall have the discretion, if it finds such jury
verdict fixing attorney's fees to be greatly excessive or inadequate, to review and
amend such portion of the verdict fixing attorney's fees without the necessity of
disapproving the entire verdict. The limitations contained in this section in reference to the amount of attorney's fees are not controlling as to the fees which may
be agreed upon by the plaintiff and his attorney for the services of such attorney in
the action against the insurer.
12. 129 Ga. App. 192, 198 S.E.2d 919 (1973).
13. 130 Ga. App. 850, 204 S.E.2d 755 (1974).
14. Id. at 851, 204 S.E.2d at 756.
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a finding for the plaintiff. Boston-Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Warr, 127 Ga.
App. 264(2) (193 SE2d 624), Home Indemnity Co. v. Godley, 122 Ga. App.
356, 363 (177 SE2d 105). Though the evidence indicated that Grady could
have died from a blow to the head, nonetheless the reason for his falling
off the bench prior to suffering the blow remains unexplained."2
The question was whether the insured had died "through external, violent
accidental means" after falling off a bench on which he was dozing.
The matter of attorneys' fees in divorce actions came before the court
5
in Margeson v. Givens,"
where the attorney-plaintiff sought to recover fees
awarded him on behalf of a wife he had represented in a divorce action. In
construing Ga. Code Ann. §30-202.1 (Rev. 1969),11 the court held that it
did not authorize an attorney in his own name to enforce an award of
attorneys' fees made to his client. This decision is in accord with the former
law and the statute which was in effect prior to 1967.11
An award of attorneys' fees under Georgia Code Ann. §20-1404 (Rev.
1965)"9 was held to be unauthorized in Palmer v. Howse.2 0 The court stated
that the majority view of the cases decided under this provision is as
follows.
A defendant without a defense may still gamble on a person's unwillingness to go to the trouble and expense of a lawsuit; but there will be, as in
any true gamble, a price to pay for losing. We do not believe the trial
courts will find any difficulty in determining whether a genuine dispute
exists - whether of law or fact, on liability or amount of damages, or on
any comparable issue. Where none is found, it may authorize the jury to
2
award the expenses of litigation. '
In Thibadeau Co. v. McMillan" an award of attorneys' fees under the
bad faith provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §20-1404 (Rev. 1965)2 was allowed
15. Id.
16. 231 Ga. 552, 203 S.E.2d 186 (1974).
17. GA. CODE ANN. §30-202.1 (Rev. 1969) provides:
The grant of attorneys' fees as a part of the expenses of litigation made at any time
during the pendency of the litigation, whether the action be for alimony, divorce
and alimony, or contempt of court arising out of either an alimony case or a divorce
and alimony case, shall be a final judgment as to the amount granted, whether the
grant be in full or on account, and may be enforced by attachment for contempt of
court or by writ of fieri facias, whether the parties subsequently reconcile or not:
Provided, that nothing contained herein shall be construed to mean that attorneys'
fees shall not be awarded at both the temporary hearing and the final hearing.
18. See White v. Bowen, 223 Ga. 94, 153 S.E.2d 706 (1967).
19.

GA. CODE ANN. §20-1404 (Rev. 1965) provides:

The expenses of litigation are not generally allowed as a part of the damages; but
if the defendent has acted in bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigious, or has
caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.
20. 133 Ga. App. 619, 212 S.E.2d 2 (1974).
21. Id. at 620-21, 212 S.E.2d at 4.
22. 132 Ga. App. 842, 209 S.E.2d 236 (1974).
23. See note 19 supra.
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to stand. The court commented that "bad faith" in this statute means
"bad faith in the transaction out of which the cause of action arose.''24
III.

EQUITY

Keith v. Keith25 was a suit to set aside a divorce decree and property
settlement agreement. Plaintiff had requested a jury trial in the complaint
but waived trial by jury at the rule nisi hearing before the judge. Defendant
had not requested jury trial relying on plaintiff's request but did so at the
rule nisi hearing. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion and proceeded to hear the case sitting as judge and jury. The supreme court
affirmed the action of the trial judge stating:
There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in equity cases. Such a right,
so far as it exists, is statutory in nature . .

.

. [It is clear that there was

no error in the trial judge proceeding to hear the matter sitting as both
judge and jury.
The supreme court judicially determined in Bettis v. Leavitt 7 the way
to get the attention of a recalcitrant defendant who deliberately sought to
evade service of process and who had been successful in thirteen attempts
to serve him by apparently outwitting a private investigator employed and
appointed to perfect service. In this suit seeking the appointment of a
receiver to take charge of the partnership assets the court stated:
One of such ways is the appointment of a temporary receiver for the assets
within the jurisdiction of the court. Such action usually brings a response,
and the responding party then has every right to show in the trial court
that the appointment of a temporary receiver was not legally justified and
should not be continued."
The rule that an action to enjoin and forclose under power of sale must
be brought in the county of the residence of the defendant, and not the
county in which the land being forclosed upon lies, was recited in Nylen
v. Barbarism by the Georgia Supreme Court.
McDonald v. McDonald0 is an interesting case because of the situation
out of which it arose and the supreme court's approach to the issues presented to it. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent her ex-husband's
parents from enforcing a note to them signed by her and her ex-husband.
In the decree in the prior divorce action her ex-husband was ordered to pay
the note. Plaintiff alleged that she was entitled to equitable relief due to
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

132 Ga. App. at 843, 209 S.E.2d at 237.
231 Ga. 230, 200 S.E.2d 891 (1973).
Id. at 231, 200 S.E.2d at 892.
230 Ga.607, 198 S.E.2d 296 (1973).
Id. at 609, 198 S.E.2d at 297.
232 Ga. 79, 205 S.E.2d 303 (1974).
232 Ga. 190, 205 S.E.2d 850 (1974).
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her ex-husband and his parents engaging in a "'fraudulent combination
to oppress' " her. 1 The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining and enjoining her "oppressors" from proceeding with the suit on
the note. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. The divorce suit was
held to be binding on strangers only as to the status of the parties. The
court further commented that no adequate explanation as to why her legal
remedy of contempt against the ex-spouse would not be adequate. It was
not decided whether her assertions of oppression were sufficient to warrant
the equitable relief prayed or whether the grant of the temporary injunction was a proper exercise of discretion by the trial judge.
The plaintiff-subcontractor in Bishop v. Flood" who failed to file a lien
against the property upon which improvements were made was caught in
the claws of the equitable maxim, "Equity aids the vigilent, not the slothful," and his suit against the owner of the property grounded upon unjust
enrichment was held to be properly dismissed.
The Supreme Court of Georgia determined in Wiley v. Wiley 3 that it
and not the Georgia Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal from a
judgment involving solely statutory partition proceedings. Such an action
is one "respecting title to land and jurisdiction based upon Article VI,
'3
Section II, Paragraph IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
IV.

PRACTICE

The question of the sufficiency of objections to the trial court's charge
was considered in Smith v. Tri-State Culvert Manufacturing Co.3" The
majority held that it was sufficient to identify the portion of the charge to
which objection is made, stating that it is no longer required to point out
to the court what it should have charged. However, the dissenting opinion
by Presiding Judge Pannell, citing the requirements of Georgia Code Ann.
§70-207(a) (Supp. 1974)," provides the better guide for the practitioner by
stating that
one objecting to a charge must state "distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection."
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 191, 205 S.E.2d at 851.
133 Ga. App. 804, 212 S.E.2d 443 (1975).
233 Ga. 824, 213 S.E.2d 682 (1975).
GA. CONST. art. VI, §II, para. IV (1945), GA. CODE ANN. §2-3704 (Rev. 1973).
131 Ga. App. 836, 207 S.E.2d 203 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §70-207(a) (Supp. 1974) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in all civil cases, no party may
complain of the giving or the failure to give an instruction to the jury, unless he
objects thereto before the jury returns its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury, and objection need not be made
with the particularity of assignments of error (abolished by this law) and need only
be as reasonably definite as the circumstances will permit . . ..
37. 131 Ga. App. at 839, 207 S.E.2d at 206.
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The plaintiff in a personal injury case, Cox v. LeRoy,38 was awarded
$20,000 for pain and suffering and $5,000 for medical expenses. Defendant
filed a motion to amend or set aside judgment, seeking to strike the $5,000
figure and substitute $1,520, contending that the former figure was in
excess of the actual amount of medical expenses introduced into evidence.
Defendant's position was that this was a "mere irregularity." The motion
was granted instanter without hearing. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:
Every court has power to amend and control its processes and orders so
as to make them conform to law and justice, and to amend its records to
conform to the truth. Code § 24-104(6). But when founded on verdicts of
a jury, and not the acts of the judge, the court may not amend the judgment, as was done here, so as not to follow the verdict. The "defendant is
relegated to his remedy of a motion for new trial, or to a proceeding in the
nature of a motion for new trial," rather than a motion to amend the
judgment. Cook v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 52 Ga. App. 610(1) (84 SE 334).
See also Ga. R. & Electric Co. v. Hamer, 1 Ga. App. 673 (58 SE 54);
Grogan v. Deraney, 38 Ga. App. 287, 290 (143 SE 912); James v. DouglasviUle Banking Co., 26 Ga. App. 509(3) (106 SE 595); Hunter v. Gillespie,
207 Ga. 574, 575 (63 SE2d 404); Martin v. General Motors Corp., 226 Ga.
860, 862 (178 SE2d 183). Accordingly, the court erred in amending the
judgment based on a verdict here without a change of the verdict in
granting a new trial."
Seemingly hard and fast rules regarding the time for making a motion
for directed verdict were established in Gleaton v. City of Atlanta., Defendant's counsel made his motion at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and
the court withheld its ruling and required defendant to present his evidence. Forms 'for special verdicts were agreed upon and submitted to the
jury, and the jury was instructed that if damages were found there would
be further proceedings before the jury. A special verdict was returned for
the plaintiff. Defendant then made a second motion for directed verdict.
The jury was released for the day and defendant's motion was granted.
Held:
Here, no motion for directed verdict was made at the close of the case or
at the close of all of the evidence; but after the jury had returned the
aforementioned special verdicts, the.motion for directed verdict was made
and granted. When said motion was made, the jury had already decided
each and every question in the case except as to the exact amount of
damages to which plaintiff was entitled. Inasmuch as the trial court
elected to submit the case to the jury for decision on certain vital questions, acquiesced in by defendant's counsel, this constituted a waiver on
defendant's part of his right to move for a directed verdict at the close of
all the evidence, as is allowed and provided for in Code Ann. §81A-150.
38.
39.
40.

130 Ga. App. 388, 203 S.E.2d 863 (1973).
Id.at 388, 203 S.E.2d at 863.
131 Ga. App. 399, 206 S.E.2d 46 (1974).
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There are only two places in point of time when a motion for directed
verdict may be made, to wit, (1) at the close of plaintiff's evidence; and
(2) at the close of all the evidence."

However, this rule has been somewhat altered by a more recent decision
in Anderson v. Universal C.I. T. Credit Corp.,42 in which the court, after
comparing the federal and state statutory provisions, stated that
it appears logical that the state statute, allowing such a motion to be made
"at the close of the case," should be construed so as to allow it to be made
anytime prior to the return of a verdict by a jury."

In Prattesv. Southeast Ceramics,Inc. " the appellee sought to invoke the
apparently little known and seldom used provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §61801 (Rev. 1975)"5 providing for 10% assessment of damages if the cause is
appealed for delay only. Appellee had obtained judgment under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §81A-137 (Rev. 1972)" due to the willful failure of
appellant to attend the taking of his deposition in that case. After judgment appellee served notice to the appellant-defendant in fi. fa. to appear
for post-judgment examination under oath. Appellant filed its "complaint
in equity" in the State Court of DeKalb County reciting that it was filed
pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. §81A-160(a) (Supp. 1974)." The judgment of
the trial court denying appellant's motion was affirmed. Then, after reciting the criterion48 for an award under the penalty provisions of Ga. Code
Ann. §6-1801 (Rev. 1975) the court further stated:
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 400-01, 206 S.E.2d at 48.
134 Ga. App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).
Id. at 933, 216 S.E.2d at 721.
132 Ga. App. 584, 208 S.E.2d 600 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §6-1801 (Rev. 1975) provides:
Ten per cent. damages may be awarded by the appellate court upon any judgment
for a sum certain, which has been affirmed, when in their opinion, the cause was
taken up for delay only, and it shall be so entered in the remittitur.
46. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-137(b)(2)C (Rev. 1972), under the heading, "Sanctions by court
in which action is pending," provides for
[ain order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party ....
47. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-160(a) (Supp. 1974) provides:
A judgment void on its face may be attacked in any court by any person. In all other
instances, judgments shall be subject to attack only by a direct proceeding brought
for that purpose in one of the methods hereinafter prescribed.
48. [W]hen a motion for damages is filed, we will carefully examine the record
and will pass upon the motion in the light of the entire history of the case as there
presented. If after reviewing the whole matter we believe that the plaintiff in error
is presenting a bona fide contest over a colorable matter, though his view of the law
may not in fact be well founded, or that he is seeking a ruling upon an open or
doubtful question, damages will be refused. But when the record discloses that the
plaintiff in error has no just case, that no new question of law is involved, and the
record is full of those things which every judge and every lawyer recognizes as
indicia of an attempt to fight merely for time, justice demands that we overcome

MERCER LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

In the instant case, our examination leads us to conclude that this appeal
was not filed for delay purposes, a view fortified by the extent of the
appellant counsel's argument and research. Accordingly, the motion for
assessment of damages is denied.4"

In Farris v. United States,50 a case brought under Ga. Code Ann. §371503 (Rev. 1962) 5' "classic statutory interpleader" as distinguished from
Ga. Code Ann. §81A-122 (Rev. 1972)2 which is more liberal than the prior
statute, the requirements for both remedies were discussed, but the court
held that neither allow interpleader where there is failure to show multiple
claims against petitioner, against same funds; which may expose petitioner
to multiple liability. The "diverse claimants seeking different remedies"
requirements of the statute were not met and the complaint was properly
dismissed by the trial court.
A case to set aside a deed must be brought in the county where the land
is and service may be made by publication if both defendants reside outside the state. This rule is espoused in Hall v. Hall."
The meaning of "costs in the appellate court" in Ga. Code Ann. §6-1704
(Rev. 1975)" 4 was the issue in Barnett v. Thomas. 5 The costs were $410.80
for the transcript, $350.50 for trial court costs and sending the record to
any personal hesitancy we may have, and that we add an award of damages to the
judgment of affirmance. 132 Ga. App. at 587, 208 S.E.2d at 601-02.
49. 132 Ga. App. at 587, 208 S.E.2d at 602.
50. 230 Ga. 862, 199 S.E.2d 782 (1973).
51. GA. CODE ANN. §37-1503 (Rev. 1962) provides:
Whenever a person shall be possessed of property or funds, or owe a debt or duty,
to which more than one person shall lay claim of such a character as to render it
doubtful or dangerous for the holder to act, he may apply to equity to compel the
claimants to interplead. If the person bringing such action shall have to make or
incur any expenses in so doing including attorney's fees, the amount so incurred
shall be taxed in the bill of costs, under the approval of the court, the court in its
discretion determining the amount of the attorney's fees, and shall be paid by the
parties cast in the suit as other costs are now paid.
52. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-122(a) (Rev. 1972) provides:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liabilitym It is not ground for objection to the joinder
that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend
do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in
part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of
this section supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted
in section 81A-120.
53. 230 Ga. 873, 199 S.E.2d 798 (1973).
54. GA. CODE ANN. §6-1704 (Rev. 1975) provides:
The attorney representing the plaintiff's cause shall, in all cases, be responsible for
the costs in the appellate court. If there is a judgment of reversal, the plaintiff in
error shall be entitled to a judgment for the amount of such costs against the
defendant in error, as soon as the remittitur is returned to the court below.
55. 129 Ga. App. 583, 200 S.E.2d 327 (1973).
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the appellate court, and $30.00 for statutory costs due the state in the court
of appeals. It was held that since both a transcript and clerk's record are
required for an effective appeal, both are included by the statute. The
claimant was accordingly awarded the costs in the court of appeals, cost
for the transcript and so much of the remaining cost as represented the
costs for preparation of the clerk's record which was transmitted to the
appellate court. The costs in the trial court were excluded from the award.
In Snooks v. Factory Square, Inc."5 a letter from the garnishee not
complying with statutory requirements in a garnishment action, but which
was later amended to fully comply with Ga. Code Ann. §46-301 (Rev.
1974)" was held to be a valid answer. This was decided under Ga. Code
Ann. §81A-108(f) (Rev. 1972),11 and although the letter was not properly
verified in that there were no words of oath, these defects were cured by
the amendment. The critically important point was that the plaintiffs were
notified of the response of the garnishee, and were not significantly prejudiced by these "errors of form." The dissent of Judge Pannell adopts the
position, however, that the letter was a nullity and could not be rendered
viable by amendment.

V.

DAMAGES

-

CONTRACT

5
Eskew v. Camp"
follows the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. §20-1405 (Rev.
1965)," holding that punitive damages are not recoverable in an action
arising ex contractu.
The court of appeals approved as a "true rule of law" the following
instructions given by the trial judge in Ayers Enterprises, Ltd. v. Adams"'
as to the measure of damages upon the breach of a construction contract:

56.
57.

129 Ga. App. 772, 201 S.E.2d 168 (1973).
GA. CODE ANN. §46-301 (Rev. 1974) provides:
In all cases of garnishment, whether the same be based on an attachment or on a
suit or judgment, the garnishee shall file his answer stating in what amount he was
indebted to the defendant at the date of the service of the summons of garnishment
and also in what sum he may have become indebted at any time between such date
and the time of the answer thereto, or what property, money or effects belonging
to defendant he had in his hands at the time of the service of the summons, or what
property, money or effects belonging to the defendant have come into his hands
between the time of the service of the summons and the making of his answer. If
the garnishee shall be due the defendant any sum for wages, the answer shall also
state specifically when the wages were earned by defendant and whether the same
were earned a daily, weekly or monthly wages. If the garnishee shall be unable to
answer as herein provided, his inability shall appear in his answer, together with
all the facts plainly, fully, and distinctly set forth, so as to enable the court to give
judgment thereon.
58. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-108(f) (Rev. 1972) provides:
All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
59. 130 Ga. App. 779, 204 S. E. 2d 465 (1974).
60. GA. CODE ANN. §20-1405 (Rev. 1965) provides:
Exemplary damages can never be allowed in cases arising on contracts.
61. 131 Ga. App. 12, 205 S.E.2d 16 (1974).
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"[Tihe plaintiff would be entitled to recover whatever sum you find to
be the difference between the contract price and the reasonable and necessary cost price to the plaintiff to complete the contract - that is, to build
the house in accordance with the terms of the original contract, whatever
you find that contract to be." He also instructed them that they had the
option to find that "the plaintiff ought to recover against the defendant
whatever amount you find the plaintiff has been damaged." 2
The joinder of a president-employee in an action for breach of contract
against the company was determined to be proper on the theory of his
negligent performance of obligation to supervise. The basis of this decision
in Howell v. Ayers"3 is Ga. Code Ann. §3-114 (Rev. 1975).1 4
Radlo of Georgia, Inc. v. Little65 is a case of first impression in that it
involves the measure of damages for the loss of future profits from the
future sale of unborn livestock. Plaintiff sought damages for breach of an
agreement whereby he raised pigs for defendant. Defendant was to furnish
gilts, sows, boars, medicines and food, and plaintiff was to raise the pigs
until they reached forty pounds in weight. Then they were to be paid for
and returned to defendant. The court determined the loss of profits from
the venture would be too remote and speculative to be recovered and the
proper measure would be the necessary expense plaintiff incurred in raising the pigs. This is the same measure that is applied in situations involving future sales of ungrown crops.
VI.

DAMAGES -

TORTS

The plaintiff in Bell v. Sigal," the mother of a nine-year-old son, filed
two actions against the physician who treated her son prior to his death.
One was for wrongful death. The second sounded in contract and sought
damages for her grief and mental anguish (solatium) resulting from the
boy's death. The second action was dismissed on motion by defendants.
The court states that damages for mental anguish of a relation or friend
due solely to grief over injury to him are not compensible, either by action
in tort or contract. The measure of damages in a death case does not
include recovery for solatium.
The following rule applicable to personal injury cases is stated in Karlan
v. Enloe.67
62. Id. at 17, 205 S.E.2d at 20.
63. 129 Ga. App. 899, 202 S.E.2d 189 (1973).
64. GA. CoDr ANN. §3-114 (Rev. 1975) provides:
A plaintiff may pursue any number of consistent or inconsistent remedies against
the same person or different persons until he shall obtain a satisfaction from some
of them.
65. 129 Ga. App. 530, 199 S.E.2d 835 (1973).
66. 129 Ga. App. 249, 199 S.E.2d 355 (1973).
67. 129 Ga. App. 1, 198 S. E. 2d 331 (1975).
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Where a verdict finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff in damages
is authorized "and where, under the uncontradicted evidence the plaintiff's special damages . . .amounted to more than the verdict without
even considering any amount for pain and suffering, the verdict was so
inadequate as to require a new trial.""8
That the amount of recovery for wrongful death is not to be diminished
by social security benefits is the rule in Georgia as expressed by the court
of appeals in Kerr v. Sims.69
The remedies for fraud resulting in the purchase of an automobile are
the subject of Central Chevrolet v. Campbel70 and City Dodge, Inc. vs.
7
Gardner,
' and should be examined to determine the alternatives available
to the defrauded purchaser in such a situation.
The measure of damages upon conversion of an automobile for the holder
of perfected security interest therein is the market value of the automobile
at the time of the conversion according to the decision in Cooper v. Citizens
Bank of Gainesville."
In Hickman v. Frazier73 the rule that expenses of litigation, including
attorneys' fees as provided for in Ga. Code Ann. §20-1404 (Rev. 1965),
cannot be recovered by a defendant is remembered and restated by the
court of appeals.
An action for damages for contamination of underground water is the
subject of North Georgia Petroleum Co. v. Lewis.7" The action was
grounded upon the negligence in providing, installing and failing to remedy a defect in gasoline tanks on property adjacent to that of the plaintiff.
The evidence showed a leakage of gas from the tanks and contamination
of plaintiff's wells. Apparently for the first time in Georgia such negligence
was held to be actionable. The court specifically stated that Georgia Code
Ann. §105-1408 (Rev. 1968) 71 does not preclude an action for injury to
underground water based upon negligence. Plaintiff was allowed to recover
damages based upon the difference in market value of his property with
and without water.
In Southern Mutual Investment Corp. v. Langston7 1 the plaintiff, owner
of property adjacent to a stream at a lower point than defendant, sought
to recover damages because of the alteration of the flow of the stream by
68. Id. at 4, 198 S.E.2d at 333.
69. 130 Ga. App. 54, 202 S.E.2d 244 (1973).
70. 129 Ga. App. 30, 198 S.E.2d 362 (1973).
71. 130 Ga. App. 502, 203 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
72. 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369 (1973).
73. 128 Ga. App. 552, 197 S.E.2d 441 (1973).
74. 128 Ga. App. 653, 197 S.E.2d 437 (1973).
75. GA. CODE ANN. §105-1408 (Rev. 1968) provides:
The course of a stream of water underground, and its exact condition before its first
use, are so difficult of ascertainment, that trespass may not be brought for any
supposed interference with the rights of a proprietor.
76. 128 Ga. App. 671, 197 S.E.2d 775 (1973).
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defendant. Plaintiff contended that defendant's alteration of the terrain on
his property increased the flow of water in the stream, resulting in damage
to plaintiffs properties caused by erosion from the excessive amount of
water discharged into the stream. The comment of the court on the wrong
complained of by plaintiff was as follows:
The principle upon which we rule this case is, that water having a time
relation, as well as a space relation, both of them being fixed by nature,
there is no more right in an adjacent proprietor to alter the one than the
other. If the time relation of the stream is so altered that the effect of the
water upon the lower tract is injuriously different from what it was by the
natural flow of the stream, then a wrong has been done to the proprietor
of the lower tract. We think that the owner of water has no more right
artifically to project it forward on another man's land than he has to push
it back upon land in his rear; and if by so doing he causes damage, he
ought to answer for it.7"
Evidence of diminuation of value of plaintiffs property resulting from
defendant's tortious interference with the flow of the stream was not admitted. Plaintiff introduced evidence only as to the cost of repair. This
measure of damages was approved as "a realistic equitable method of
assessing the damages''78 and held to come within the exception to the
above stated general rule.
In Southern R.R. v. A. 0. Smith Corp."9 the court of appeals held that
the 1972 statutes changing the Georgia law on contribution and indemnity80 apply to those cases in which the "injury or event on which liability
depends" occurs after the effective date of the act.8' This was construed to
mean the date of the plaintiffs cause of action arose, rather than the date
the claim was compromised and paid by one of the tortfeasors. Query: does
not the joint tortfeasor's right to contribution arise upon payment of the
claim?
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 673, 197 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 675, 197 S.E.2d at 778.
134 Ga. App. 219, 213 S.E.2d 903 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §105-2012(1) (Supp. 1974), which provides:
Where the tortious act does not involve moral turpitude, contribution among several trespassers may be enforced just as if they had been jointly sued. Without the
necessity of being charged by suit or judgment, the right of contribution from
another or others shall continue unabated and shall not be lost or prejudiced by
compromise and settlement of a claim or claims for injury to person or property or
for wrongful death, and release therefrom.
GA. CODE ANN. §20-1206 (Supp. 1974), which provides:
Without the necessity of being charged by suit or judgment, the right of indemnity,
express or implied, from another or others shall continue unabated and shall not
be lost or prejudiced by compromise and settlement of a claim or claims for injury
to person or property or for wrongful death, and release therefrom.
81. The effective dates of GA. CODE ANN. §105-2012 (Supp. 1974) and GA. CODE ANN. §201206 (Supp. 1974) are March 7, 1972, and March 10, 1966, respectively.
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In the personal injury case of Atlanta Transit System, Inc. v. Robinson"
the verdict was attacked as excessive. The court expressed the following
opinion:
An excessive or inadequate verdict constitutes a mistake of fact rather
than of law. It addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge who saw
the witnesses and heard the testimony. This court is a court for the correction of errors of law only, and this court's jurisdiction is confined to the
question of whether the trial court abused his discretion in overruling the
motion for a new trial on this ground. [cits.]. In the present case, where
the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff shows painful and permanent
injuries with loss of physical function, it cannot be said that the verdict
is excessive as a matter of law. 3
This may be the sound of the future on this point as the appellate courts
seem more and more inclined to deny relief of this nature. It is hard to
understand why the same reasoning is not applied upon review of attorneys' fees awards.
Porterfield v. Gilmer 4 is a "case involving legal principles generally
referred to as 'estoppel by judgment,' 'collateral estoppel,' 'estoppel by
verdict,' or 'res judicata.' "5 The Porterfields, husband and wife, sued
Gilmer's master in federal court for injuries received in an automobile
accident. The husband-Porterfield recovered nothing on his claim. Gilmer,
the servant, was not made a party to the federal suit, but was sued by the
husband-Porterfield in the instant action. Gilmer's first defense was:
Res judicata and/or estoppel by judgment and/or the law of the case
and/or the fact that all of these matters were either previously litigated
or could have been litigated previously."6
The trial court granted Gilmer's motion for summary judgment as to this
defense. The court commented that the relationship of master and servant
does necessarily constitute the priority required before one can assert the
defense of res judicata or estoppel by judgment. A master may assert these
defenses even though he was not a party to the action against the servant.
The explanation is that these defenses are available due to the master's
liability being derivative to that of the servant. However, such is not the
case when the second suit is against the servant who was not a party to
the prior suit against the master. Accordingly, the servant may not assert
the defense of res judicata or estoppel by judgment as a bar to subsequent
action against him. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Gilmer, going further to state that there was no mutuality of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

134 Ga. App. 170, 213
Id. at 171, 213 S.E.2d
132 Ga. App. 463, 208
Id. at 464, 208 S.E.2d
Id.

S.E.2d 547 (1975).
at 549.
S.E.2d 295 (1974).
at 296.
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estoppel present between Gilmer and Porterfield and that the mutuality
rule precludes Gilmer from taking advantage of res judicata or estoppel by
judgment. It should be noted that throughout this decision the court failed
to recognize any distinction between the concepts of res judicata or
estoppel by judgment. The dissenting opinion of Judge Stolz appears to
be well reasoned, well written and more consistent with prior law regarding
the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
In Bennett v. Haley"7 the court of appeals ruled that medical and hospital bills paid by Medicaid"8 are recoverable by a plaintiff.
The collateral source rule permits an injured party to recover damages
from a defendant notwithstanding that the plaintiff received compensation from other sources. 8
This established principle does not permit a tortfeasor to take advantage
of medical expenses paid by others. 0 Accordingly, the collateral source rule
prevents evidence as to payment of Medicaid to be proved by a defendant
so as to reduce a recovery by plaintiff, and the fact that the collateral
source is a government sponsored program for the indigent is insignificant.'
In Simmons v. Brock92 a verdict for the plaintiff in a physical assault
case for $1.00 was found inadequate.
Since the evidence authorized the finding of the jury establishing the
liability of the defendant, and the undisputed evidence showed actual
damages to the plaintiff resulting from the injuries sustained, a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for less than the actual damages proved was grossly
3
inadequate.1
The plaintiff in Barnes v. Cornett 4 presented evidence as to her lost
earnings up to the time of filing her complaint and evidence from which it
could be concluded that her capacity to labor was decreased 15% due to
the injuries from the auto collision out of which the action arose. The court
held that this "proof . . .was not sufficient to create justiciable issue as
to lost earning capacity, '95 explaining that lost earning capacity and lost
ability to labor are decidedly different matters. Lost earning capacity must
be proven with reasonable certainty, whereas lost ability to labor is an
element of damage in the nature of pain and suffering and is measured by
the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

132 Ga. App. 512, 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974).
42 U.S.C.A. §1396a(a)25 (Rev. 1974).
132 Ga. App. at 522, 208 S.E.2d at 310.

Id.
Id. at 524, 208 S.E.2d at 311.
131 Ga. App. 275, 205
Id. at 276, 205 S.E.2d
134 Ga. App. 120, 213
Id. at 121, 213 S.E.2d

S.E.2d 716 (1974).
at 717.
S.E.2d 703 (1975).
at 705.
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Gilmore v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority" is another case of first
impression in Georgia. In this case, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action for the full value of her daughter's life. She recovered from the
defendant and later executed satisfaction of the judgment of record. She
then brought the action herein against the Hospital Authority seeking
recovery for the full value of her daughter's life. The court affirmed the
trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant,
reasoning that the wrongful death statute provides only one cause of action
and that the satisfaction of the prior judgment extinguished it.
In Blanchard v. Westview Cemetery, Inc."7 a grave wrong was allegedly
committed and a tort action was brought by a widow against the cemetery
for the "unauthorized and unlawful"98 moving of her late husband's body
from one burial site to another. She obtained judgment for $15,000 actual
and $85,000 punitive damages. There is included in the court's opinion a
discourse on the law of Georgia regarding exemplary and vindictive damages. The application of the pertinent statutes" is thoroughly discussed.
The specific problem presented to the court was whether the plaintiff suing
for an injury to "wounded feelings" could recover additional exemplary
damages. The court's resolution of this question was stated thusly:
Obviously, the plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages for injury
to her peace, feelings and happiness (mental pain and suffering alone
arising out of a wilful tort) and exemplary damages for "wounded feelings." This would amount to a recovery of 'double damages' which is not
allowed. Southern R. Co. v. Jordan, 129 Ga. 665, supra; Johnson v. Morris,
158 Ga. 403 (123 SE 707). However, the plaintiff may seek compensatory
damages for injury to her peace, feelings and happiness (mental pain and
suffering alone arising out of a wilful tort) and exemplary damages to deter
the wrongdoer.'"
96. 132 Ga. App. 879; 209 S.E.2d 676 (1974).
97. 133 Ga. App. 262, 211 S.E.2d 135 (1974).
98. Id. at 262, 211 S.E.2d at 137.
99. GA. CODE ANN. §105-2001 (Rev. 1968), which provides:
Damages are given as compensation for the injury done, and generally this is the
measure where the injury is of a character capable of being estimated in money. If
the injury is small, or the mitigating circumstances are strong, nominal damages
only are given.
GA. CODE ANN. §105-2002 (Rev. 1968), which provides:
In every tort there may be aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the
intention, and in that event the jury may give additional damages, either to deter
the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded
feelings of the plaintiff.
GA. CODE ANN. §105-2003 (Rev. 1968), which provides:
In some torts the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff;
in such cases no measure of damages can be prescribed, except the enlightened

conscience of impartial jurors. The worldly circumstances of the parties, the
amount of bad faith in the transaction, and all the attendant facts should be
weighed. The verdict of a jury in such case should not be disturbed, unless the court
should suspect bias or prejudice from its excess or its inadequacy.
100. 133 Ga. App. at 271, 211 S.E.2d at 142.
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The Court of Appeals distinguishes use and abuse of process actions in
Goodwin Agency, Inc. v. Chesser"' as follows:
Generally, malicious use of legal process implies an ulterior motive in
procuring the issuance of process, whereas abuse of legal process involves
an improper use after its issuance. In malicious use of legal process cases,
it is incumbent upon the complaining party to show a successful termination of the previous litigation. Such prerequisite of a successful termination does not exist in an action for malicious abuse of process.

.

.

. There

is a malicious abuse of process where a party employs process legally and
properly issued, wrongfully and unlawfully for a purpose which is not
intended by law to effect; and for such malicious abuse of civil or criminal
process an action
will lie against the plaintiff or the officer responsible for
02
-the abuse.
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

The supreme court has recognized in GeorgiaPower Co. v. Bray 0 a right
of action under the Georgia Constitution' 4 in an owner of property for
damages resulting from the condemnation of continuous property not the
subject of the taking by condemnation.
Consequential damages to a contiguous tract of land having a different
ownership from that in which the taking occurs may be real and may in
fact exist, but a separate owner's claim for consequential damages to his
land contiguous to the tract where the taking occurs cannot be asserted
in a condemnation action. 05
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court
in North Georgia FinishingCorp. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,1o holding the Georgia
statute authorizing prejudgment issue of garnishments 7 unconstitutional.
In so doing the Court continued to vacillate on its case by case approach
to problems of procedural due process. Either in response or anticipation
of the decision in Di-Chem, the Georgia legislature passed a new act in
1975 which includes a number of prerequisites to garnishment. 01 This new
statute was apparently based upon the Louisiana statute held to be constitutionally permissible in Mitchell v. W, T. Grant Co. 09
1 There are, however,
some significant differences in the two statutory schemes and these may
in turn make the difference between the Georgia statute being held consti101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

131 Ga. App. 686, 206 S.E.2d 568 (1974).
Id. at 688-89, 206 S.E.2d at 570.
232 Ga. 558, 207 S.E.2d 442 (1974).
GA. CONST. art. I, §111, para. 1 (1945), GA. CODE ANN. §2-301 (Rev. 1973).
232 Ga. 558, 207 S.E.2d 442 (1974).
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §46-101 (Rev. 1974).

Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1291.
416 U.S. 600 (1974).

1975]

REMEDIES

219

tutional or unconstitutional in the future due to the possible effect of DiChem upon Mitchell's holding.
A similar problem was presented to the Georgia Supreme Court in Ruff
v. Lee,"10 where the court held that a sale of real estate under the powers
of sale in a deed to secure debt was not violative of procedural due process
standards in spite of the fact that the Goergia statute incorporated therein
did not provide for a hearing prior to the sale. The holding in this case will
very probably be subject to question in view of recent federal decisions
dealing with this specific problem."'
110. 230 Ga. 426, 197 S.E.2d 376 (1973).
111. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975); Law v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Note, Constitutional Law - Due Process - Louisiana Ex Parte Sequestration Procedure
Held Constitutional, 26 MERCER L. REv. 325 (1974).

